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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Ronald Goode appeals the District Court’s imposition of a 27-month sentence for 
violating the terms of his supervised release.  Goode maintains that his due process rights 
were violated by the District Court’s delay in holding a revocation hearing.  While the 
delay underlying Goode’s case at first glance seems unusually lengthy, we cannot 
identify a constitutional violation that would give rise to a due process claim.  Thus, we 
will affirm the District Court’s sentence. 
I. 
A. 
 Goode pleaded guilty in 2003 to federal drug charges.  He served 130 months in 
prison.  In March of 2011, Goode was released from federal prison, and began serving a 
five-year term of supervised release.  Four months into his supervised release term, 
Goode was arrested on state charges of attempted murder, assault, and various firearms 
infractions.  The day after Goode’s arrest, the federal probation office filed a Violation of 
Supervised Release petition, which the District Court signed the next day.  Although a 
federal arrest warrant for Goode was issued on July 15, 2011, the District Court would 
not hold a hearing on the matter until September of 2016.  This hiatus forms the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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gravamen of Goode’s complaint.  For ease of reference, we include the following 
chronological summary of events, noting dates of relevance to this appeal:  
1/27/2003 Goode pleads guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine 
6/9/2003 Goode sentenced to 162 months’ imprisonment, five years of supervised 
release, and $1000 fine 
3/14/2011 Goode completes jail time and begins his term of supervised release. 
5/10/2011 Goode volunteers for and is accepted to the Eastern District’s STAR 
program (supervision to aid re entry)           
7/13/2011 Goode arrested by Philadelphia police department and charged with 
attempted murder, aggravated assault, and several firearms offenses 
7/14/2011 United States Probation Office files a revocation petition on the basis of 
Goode’s arrest 
7/15/2011 The District Court signs the petition and issues an arrest warrant. 
11/2011 Goode requests a continuance of state court trial  
11/2011 Goode requests another continuance to explore a plea bargain 
7/2012 Trial set in state court but continued 
2/2013 Goode’s counsel permitted to withdraw and new counsel appointed 
5/2013 Goode’s counsel request a jury trial 
12/4/2013 Jury is selected 
12/9/2013 State trial postponed due to issue with a witness 
12/18/2013 New counsel appointed and trial postponed again 
6/2/2014 Goode files motion in the District Court asking for a hearing on his 
supervised relief violation 
10/2/2014 Goode pleads guilty in Philadelphia Common Pleas Court to aggravated 
assault and firearms offenses 
11/19/2014 District Court construes motion as one asking to lift federal detainer and 
denies it because the detainer was not yet operative 
6/2015 Goode again writes to federal court asking for counsel and a revocation 
hearing.  He explains that state court has not sentenced him because it is 
waiting for federal court to sentence on violation of supervised release.   
12/20/2015 Goode sentenced in state court to two and one half to five years 
imprisonment 
1/27/2016 Goode makes third request for federal court to go forward with his 
revocation hearing.   
7/16/2016 Goode completes state court sentence and is released from state custody 
9/7/2016 Goode is arrested by federal authorities on the arrest warrant 
9/12/2016 Goode admits to violating supervised release and is sentenced to 27 
months’ imprisonment 
 




 Before turning to a discussion of the issues raised in this appeal, we need to 
resolve the parties’ disagreement over the appropriate standard of review.  The 
Government urges us to apply a plain error standard of review, maintaining that Goode 
never sought to dismiss the petition for revocation on due process grounds (or any other 
basis, for that matter).  Goode, for his part, maintains that he did object to the delay in the 
revocation hearing by the filing of three pro se motions in the District Court asking it to 
proceed on the petition, and specifically invoking his right to due process. 
 We side with Goode here and will not review this appeal for plain error.  First, 
Goode’s pro se filings satisfy Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b), which defines the preservation rule 
in criminal cases.  Through these filings, Goode informed the District Court what he 
wanted it to do.  Second, the Government’s position elevates form over function.  While 
it may be true that defendants “typically” object through a motion to dismiss the violation 
petition (see Gov’t Br. at 16-17), there is no rule that says any objection must be made 
that way.  We will, therefore, exercise plenary review over the alleged violations of the 
Constitution.  See United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 2009). 
II. 
A. 
 Hearings to revoke supervised release, like hearings to revoke parole, are not 
criminal prosecutions.  As such, these proceedings do not trigger the “full panoply of 
rights’ which attach during a criminal trial, including the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of a ‘speedy trial.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).  These proceedings 
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do, however, affect the liberty interests of individuals, and trigger limited protections 
under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 484.  One due process right triggered by a 
revocation proceeding is the right to have a “revocation hearing . . . within a reasonable 
time after the parolee is taken into custody.”  Id. at 488.  This right has been codified in 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2), which requires that courts “must hold the revocation hearing 
within a reasonable time.”  When evaluating claims under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1, courts 
often look to the factors the Supreme Court laid out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972), because of the analogous context of the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial.  
United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 570 (3d Cir. 2004). Those factors are: “[l]ength 
of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to 
the defendant.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  We will start with the prejudice inquiry, as our 
determination on that point renders further inquiry unnecessary. 
 Although Goode points to what he believes was a five-year delay, it was not as 
long as he supposes.  This is because Goode’s right to a timely revocation hearing is 
measured from the time he was taken into custody pursuant to the revocation arrest 
warrant—not from the time the arrest warrant was issued.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486 (a 
defendant has the right to have a revocation hearing within “a reasonable time after the 
parolee is taken into custody.”).  This makes sense because a parolee does not suffer a 
loss of liberty as a parole violator until he is taken into custody per the violation order.   
 Goode takes issue with this measurement.  He maintains that the delay should be 
measured from the date the revocation warrant was issued.  He cites one of our decisions 
in support of his position, Poellnitz, supra.  But his reliance on that decision is misplaced.  
Case: 16-3719     Document: 003112659469     Page: 5      Date Filed: 06/26/2017
6 
 
First, Poellnitz involved a statutory claim brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)—not a 
straight-up due process claim like Goode’s.  Second, we specifically stated in Poellnitz 
that “it was reasonable for the District Court to wait for the adjudication of the state court 
charges before proceeding with the revocation hearing.”  Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 571.  
Here, the adjudication of the charges in state court took a great deal of time, due to 
various delays, changes of counsel, etc.  After his release from state custody (July 16, 
2016), Goode was arrested by federal authorities (September 7, 2016), and the District 
Court held a revocation hearing a mere five days later (September 12, 2016).  Goode did 
not suffer a loss of liberty until September 7, 2016 (a Wednesday), and was given a 
hearing on September 12, 2016 (the following Monday).  This delay was not 
unreasonable, and, therefore, Goode’s rights were not violated.   
 Goode claims he was prejudiced because the District Court’s delay in holding a 
revocation hearing ruined an opportunity for his federal and state sentences to run 
concurrently.  This argument is also foreclosed by U.S. ex rel. Caruso v. U.S. Bd. of 
Parole, 570 F.2d 1150, 1154 (3d Cir. 1978), which clarifies that a defendant cannot claim 
prejudice from a delay in receiving a revocation hearing on the ground that the delay 
prohibited him from serving his federal and state sentences concurrently.  Id.  
Furthermore, the District Court certainly could have ordered—given its considerable 
discretion in sentencing matters—that Goode’s federal sentence for violating supervised 
release run retroactively concurrently with his state sentence.  And, Goode’s counsel in 
the District Court asked that this option be considered.  App. 45-46.  The District Court 
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specifically declined to do so.  App. 49.  It determined that “another prison sentence” was 
warranted given Goode’s crime, and we will not disturb that conclusion on appeal. 
 Goode also maintains that he was prejudiced by the delay of his revocation 
hearing because he was “subjected to another arrest” and because the District Court was 
able to rely on his state conviction as an “aggravating factor” in sentencing him on the 
supervised release violation.  These claims are pointless.  First, Goode’s argument about 
being subject to an additional arrest is baseless.  He argues that if he had been given a 
timely revocation hearing, he could have been transported to federal prison directly from 
state prison without having to be arrested again.  But, he enjoyed a few months at liberty 
after his state sentence was completed and before his federal sentence began.  He 
certainly was not clamoring to go directly to federal prison to avoid re-arrest.   
 Goode also tells us that, given the length of delay between the revocation petition 
and the hearing, prejudice should be presumed.  We disagree.  First, and as discussed 
previously, the delay is not as long as Goode thinks.  We put it at five days, two of which 
were the weekend.  Second, while it is true that prejudice has been presumed in some 
instances involving Sixth Amendment claims, see e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 
647, 655 (1992) (A]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every 
speedy trial claim.”); Battis, 589 F.3d at 684, no court has ever presumed prejudice from 
a delay in a revocation hearing.  See, e.g., Santana, 526 F.3d at 1261 (“[W]e apply our 
ordinary test in supervised release revocation cases and search for actual prejudice.”).   
 Our decision in United States v. Heiser, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1994), does leave 
open the possibility that a situation may arise where a court may presume prejudice in a 
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post-conviction delay context, but this is not such a case.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the most serious form of prejudice is that which results in the impairment 
of an acused’s ability to lodge a defense.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56.  Here, nothing 
prevented Goode from raising a defense to the charges of violating supervised release, 
and, in fact, he pleaded guilty to those charges.  This is reason enough to decline applying 
a presumption of prejudice.  But also, Goode admitted that he violated the terms of his 
supervised release, which too weighs against a presumption of prejudice.  And, he has not 
pointed to anything that could have shown that he was denied a chance for leniency on 
his revocation sentence. 
III. 
 Goode cannot show prejudice here for any delay between the petition for 
revocation being executed and his hearing on the matter.  There is no basis on this record 
to vacate the District Court’s order.  We will affirm.   
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